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Abstract
Trust is a double-edged sword. When warranted, it leads to positive and rewarding
interactions. When not, it leads to disappointment and anger. Therefore, it has been
argued that people will display “betrayal aversion” in trust situations (i.e., avoid
trusting to avoid betrayal). Yet, people also feel tense and uneasy when they signal
distrust to another person and thus show signs of “principled trustfulness”
(i.e., choosing to trust others although being skeptical of their trustworthiness). These
two theoretical orientations imply directly opposite influences on trust behavior.
Thus, we conducted two laboratory studies (with a total of 841 participants) with
binary trust games (implying a risk of being betrayed) and extended lottery games
(implying no such risk). In both studies, we varied the payoff structures of both
games. Further, we made sure that the average perceived likelihood of winning or
losing money when choosing the risky option was identical in both games, as was the
distribution of these likelihoods. Neither study showed any sign of betrayal aversion.
Rather, participants were more willing to risk their money in the trust game than they
were to invest their money in a lottery, supporting the principled trustfulness view.
We discuss possible explanations why, unlike previous studies, we did not find any
indication of betrayal aversion.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Trust is essential for nearly all kinds of interactions in which people
engage. Trust helps individuals to increase their income (Stavrova &
Ehlebracht, 2016), friendships to endure and marriages to thrive
(Simpson, 2007), companies to achieve success (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995; Williamson, 1993), and countries to prosper
(Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001). However, trust is always
a double-edged sword. Extending trust may be honored, but it may
also be exploited.
In the last few decades, both psychologists and economists have
used the so-called trust game to investigate trust behavior in the labo-
ratory (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Johnson & Mislin, 2011;
Snijders & Keren, 1999). In the binary version of this paradigm, Persons
A (the trustors) get a certain amount of money that they can either
keep for sure or send to another Person B (the trustees). If Persons A
hand over their money, Persons B get a multitude of the initial endow-
ment of Persons A and then have to decide how to split the money.
They can either divide the money evenly between both players or keep
most (or all) of the money for themselves. The specific payoff structures
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vary between different studies, but they are consistent with regard to
one crucial aspect: if Persons B turn out to be trustworthy, it pays off
for Persons A to be trustful. If, however, Persons B turn out to be
untrustworthy, Persons A are getting less money than if they had kept
their initial endowment. Although the paradigm of the trust game might
seem somewhat artificial at first glance, it encapsulates the very
essence of trust: making oneself vulnerable to the trustworthiness of
another person (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Thielmann &
Hilbig, 2015). In the trust game as in real life, trust is always a decision
under uncertainty (Gambetta, 1988).
But, how do people deal with such uncertainties when making
decisions to trust or not to trust another person? More specifically,
are they as willing, are they less willing, or are they more willing to
choose the risky option in a trust game compared with nonsocial risks
like taking part in a lottery? Interestingly, so far, the empirical
evidence regarding this question is rather mixed. We therefore
summarize the state of the literature and then report two studies that
aimed to clarify the reasons for the contradictory results found in
previous research.
1.1 | Trust as an ordinary decision
From a purely economic perspective, decisions to trust should follow
the same rules as all other decisions under uncertainty (Berg et al.,
1995; Coleman, 1990). Self-interested Persons B should never
reciprocate the trust of Persons A. As everybody knows that Persons
B will act selfishly, Persons A should definitely keep their money for
themselves and show no trust (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006).
Yet, there are rational choice models of trust that allow for trust-
worthiness on the side of Person B (Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 2002). In
these models, when deciding which alternative to choose in a trust
game, Persons A as rational actors will reflect on their potential losses
and profits, estimate the likelihood of Persons B to reciprocate their
trust, and will then choose the alternative with the highest subjective
expected utility. Take for example a trust game with an initial endow-
ment of $5 for Person A, a chance to earn $10 if Person B proves to
be trustworthy, and an outcome of $0 for Person A if Person B keeps
all the money for themselves. Technically, such a payoff structure
equals the payoff structure of an ordinary coin-flip (with the rule
“double or nothing”). If Persons A estimate the number of trustworthy
Persons B to be higher than 50% and they would be willing to go for a
coin-flip (i.e., a 50% chance to double their money), they should take
the risky option in the trust game. If, however, Persons A estimate the
number of trustworthy Persons B to be lower than 50% and they are
not willing to go for a coin-flip, they should neither be willing to
choose the risky option in the trust game.
Thus, according to the rational actor model, trust decisions will
not be different from nonsocial decisions and will solely be based on
expected outcomes and actors' level of risk avoidance (Coleman,
1990). There is indeed evidence that speaks for the validity of such a
model. Trust decisions are consistently influenced by expectations of
Persons B's trustworthiness (Evans & Krueger, 2014), by the
incentives for Persons B to reciprocate Persons A's trust or not
(Snijders & Keren, 1999), and by the payoff structure (i.e., the incen-
tives to trust) of Persons A (Evans & Krueger, 2016). However, it has
repeatedly been shown that behavior in trust games is also rather
unrelated to a person's general risk attitude (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Pia-
nkov, 2006; Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009) or
their risk-proneness on a behavioral level as regards nonsocial risks
like participating in a lottery (Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Houser, Schunk, &
Winter, 2010).
1.2 | Distrust as betrayal aversion
More generally, one might argue that such a putatively rational
approach leaves out the essentially social nature of trust: If someone
loses money in a coin-flip, there is nobody to be angry about, but if
someone loses their money in a trust game, they have been fooled by
another person. To avoid the experience of being a “sucker,” people
might demand a higher chance of winning for taking the risky decision
in a trust game as compared to a situation where such a risk does not
exist. This phenomenon has been called “betrayal aversion” by
economists (e.g., Aimone & Houser, 2012; Bohnet & Zeckhauser,
2004; or “exploitation aversion”, Fehr, Fischbacher, & Kosfeld, 2005)
and “sugrophobia” (i.e., the fear of being a sucker) by psychologists
(Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007).
There is evidence that people are betrayal averse in that they try
to avoid making themselves vulnerable to the questionable trustworthi-
ness of a Person B. The first authors to demonstrate such a betrayal
aversion empirically were Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). In their study,
participants got an endowment of $10 they could either keep for sure
or hand over to Person B. In the latter case, Person B had a total of
$30 at their disposal that they could either split evenly (i.e., $15 for
both players) or of which they could keep $22 for themselves and only
give $8 to Person A. In the position of Person A, participants had to
indicate what percentage of Persons B at least had to be trustworthy
for them to choose the risky option. In a control condition, participants
had the chance to take part in a lottery with the same payoff structure
and they had to indicate the minimum chance of winning necessary for
them to choose that gamble. As it turned out, the mean “minimum
acceptable probability” (MAP) was higher in the trust game than in the
lottery (54% versus 37%), so people seemed to demand a premium to
trust. Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2008) were able to
show this phenomenon across six different countries.
Especially among economists, the concept of betrayal aversion
has become quite ubiquitous as an explanation for (dis)trust behavior
following Bohnet's and Zeckhauser's work (see, e.g., Butler & Miller,
2017; Cubitt, Gächter, & Quercia, 2017; Fehr, 2009). For example,
Fehr (2009) states: “Betrayal aversion as documented in the work of
Bohnet and coauthors seems to play a particularly important role in
trusting behavior” (pp. 236–237). Its growing popularity altered the
traditional economic view of decision-making under risk which did not
distinguish between different sources of risk. But the idea of betrayal
aversion has gained momentum among psychologists, too. For
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example, in their review on trust, Thielmann and Hilbig (2015) concep-
tualize betrayal sensitivity as one of three core components of trust
behavior alongside risk attitudes and trustworthiness expectations.
Effron and Miller (2011) provided support for Bohnet's and
Zeckhauser's results: Using a similar paradigm, they showed that peo-
ple anticipate and indeed experience more self-blame when being
exploited by another person as compared with losing in a lottery, and
that anticipated self-blame mediated the effect of paradigm (trust
game versus lottery) on participants' “minimum acceptable probabil-
ity.” Further, in a number of studies, Aimone and Houser (2011, 2012,
2013) claim to have shown the phenomenon of betrayal aversion
using a different experimental paradigm. Their change in design had
the purpose of overcoming a number of weaknesses of the MAP
design. One example is the difficulty of disentangling betrayal aver-
sion and loss aversion: If a player expects a high trustworthiness rate,
it might feel like a loss to indicate a MAP that falls below this rate
(Aimone & Houser, 2012). Other weaknesses are
“… potential confounds including disutility from loss of
control, assessment costs associated with calculating
trustworthiness, costs of making incorrect assessments,
costs from placing trustees in a potentially undesirable
decision situation, and disutility from earning money
due to other people's kindness as factors that could lead
to differences between treatments” (p. 573).
Furthermore—as will be made clear throughout the following
paragraphs—asking people for their prerequisite to participate in a
trust game might only provide very limited information on how they
would behave were they already placed in such a situation
(Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012).
In the design Aimone and Houser (2012) opted for, their partici-
pants played an ordinary trust game in one condition (the know condi-
tion). In another condition (the don't know condition), participants
were told that they would not be coupled with a specific Person
B. Instead, winning or losing would be decided by the random draw of
a computer with their chance of winning being based on the number
of trustworthy Persons B in the know condition. Thus, from a purely
mathematical perspective, both conditions were identical. Yet, as
Aimone and Houser argue, only in the know condition do participants
face the danger of being personally betrayed. In line with their
hypothesis, more participants chose the risky option in the don't know
condition than in the know condition (Aimone & Houser, 2011, 2012).
Aimone, Houser, and Weber (2014) replicated this finding and addi-
tionally gathered functional MRI data showing a heightened activation
of the anterior insular cortex in the know condition as compared with
the don't know condition, indicating heightened negative arousal.
1.3 | Trust as principled behavior
Yet, as mentioned above, there is also evidence for what has been
called “principled trustfulness” by Fetchenhauer and Dunning
(e.g., 2012). Why should something like this exist? When not trusting
another person, one is sending a rather negative signal: “I am keeping
my money because I think you are not trustworthy.” People might try
to avoid this signal, as in social life we often act out of politeness
rather than out of honesty (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Lerman, 2006). We
will never be told by a date that we are ugly; we will never tell a friend
that their clothes make them look fat. Distrust might be another
example for something we experience but do not want to signal to
another person. Maybe this tendency is so hard-wired that it influ-
ences participants' behavior even in anonymous one-shot interactions
in a behavioral economics lab.
Indeed, there is empirical evidence for this phenomenon. In a
large number of studies, it has been shown that a majority of people is
willing to take risks in trust games that they would never take in a
(nonsocial) lottery (for an overview, see Dunning, Fetchenhauer, &
Schlösser, 2019). For example, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009)
compared participants' willingness to choose the risky option between
a trust game and a lottery (sharing the same payoff structure). Based
on their own estimates of Persons B's trustworthiness and their level
of risk aversion revealed in the lottery paradigm, only 30.2% of Per-
sons A should have handed over their money to Persons B. Yet, more
than twice as many participants (64.4%) actually chose the risky
option in the trust game. In another study, participants were either
told that they could flip a coin with the chances of doubling their
endowment being 46% or that they could play a trust game with
chances of 46% to be coupled with a trustworthy Person B
(Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012). Only a minority of 29% went for
the risky option in the coin-flip, but a full 54% of participants decided
to trust although the expected value of the risky option in this para-
digm was lower than keeping one's $5.
Follow-up studies showed that this high willingness to act trustfully
is governed by moral emotions (especially the emotions of feeling tense,
stressed, and guilty at the idea of keeping the initial endowment;
Schlösser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2013; Schlösser, Fetchenhauer, &
Dunning, 2016) and by the feeling that one should (although one may
not necessarily want to) hand over the money to Person B
(e.g., Dunning, Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014).
Note that in all of these studies, participants interacted with each other
for actual money and under conditions of full anonymity.
1.4 | How to explain the contradictions?
To summarize, there is empirical evidence for both betrayal aversion
(i.e., avoiding the risky option in trust games if possible) and principled
trustfulness (i.e., avoiding to signal one's distrust to Person B). How
can these diametrically opposed results be reconciled?
There are a couple of factors to note. First, the studies took place
in different labs with different participants and with different instruc-
tions. Thus, the present studies aimed to directly compare different
paradigms within the same samples.
Second, in studies finding principled trustfulness, participants
were placed in concrete trust games with respective specific
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interaction partners that led, as Fetchenhauer and Dunning
(e.g., 2012) argue, participants to feel obliged to hand over their
money to Person B. Such immediate emotions felt at the cusp of mak-
ing a decision frequently drive behavior (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, &
Welch, 2001; Schlösser et al., 2013). However, to indicate a minimum
acceptable probability of approaching a trustworthy Person B
(as participants did in, e.g., Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004, and Effron &
Miller, 2011) might rather feel like a hypothetical choice, one still
under construction, in which such feelings of moral obligations do not
evolve. Indeed, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) showed that trust
rates went up when participants had to make actual and not only
hypothetical decisions (see also Holm & Nystedt, 2008).
Third, the results of Aimone and Houser (2012) might not be very
robust. Cell sizes are rather low (less than 30 participants per condi-
tion), and a study conceptualizing betrayal aversion as a personality
measure revealed that only 44.6% of all participants could be classi-
fied as “betrayal averse,” 23.2% as “betrayal neutral,” and 32.1% even
as “betrayal seekers” (Aimone, Ball, & King-Casas, 2015). This is hard
to reconcile with the claim that people in general are less willing to
take social than nonsocial risks.
Fourth, the instructions used by Aimone and Houser were rather
technically and complexly worded and might have been misunder-
stood by some participants. In a pretest, we measured whether
participants understood the paradigm of the don't know condition. To
do so, we used the original instructions of Aimone et al. (2014), and
asked eight control questions incentivizing valid answers by giving
participants €10 if they got all answers right. Only 7 out of 31 partici-
pants (23%) were able to answer all control questions correctly
(Götmann, 2014).
Fifth, although in those studies demonstrating betrayal aversion
Persons B got the same initial endowment as Persons A, this was not
the case in the studies by Fetchenhauer and Dunning (e.g., 2009 and
2012). Thus, one could argue that what they have called principled
trustfulness might just be an example of inequality aversion
(i.e., Persons A did not want Persons B to leave the lab empty-
handed). Therefore, in the present studies, Persons A and Persons B
got the same amount of money in the case Persons A decided to keep
their initial endowment (note, however, that in Schlösser, Mensching,
Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2015, Persons A revealed principled trust-
fulness even when they had to play with their own, personal money).
Sixth, the payoff structure was different. In all studies of
Fetchenhauer and Dunning, a symmetrical payoff structure was used.
Persons A could either lose or double their initial endowment when
choosing the risky option. In all studies showing betrayal aversion, the
payoff structures were asymmetrical (cf. Aimone & Houser, 2011,
2012, and 2013; Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004;
Effron & Miller, 2011). In the specific studies of Aimone and Houser,
participants could increase their initial endowment by 200% if they
were coupled with a trustworthy Person B (i.e., making $30 out of
$10), but, even when being coupled with an untrustworthy Person B,
they did not lose all their endowment but kept $2 out of their initial
$10. It has to be mentioned that the labs finding betrayal aversion and
principled trustfulness tend to treat their respective specific payoff
structure as quite arbitrary and—at least implicitly—hold that their
results will not depend on it. In the present studies we therefore
applied the payoff structure used by Aimone and Houser as well as
the payoff structure used by Fetchenhauer and Dunning and com-
pared them directly with each other.
Seventh, the contrast condition to the ordinary trust game dif-
fered. Whereas both labs played ordinary trust games they differed
with regard to the conditions that served as a contrast (the don't
know condition in the studies by Aimone and Houser and lotteries in
the studies by Fetchenhauer and Dunning). To give both approaches a
fair chance, we decided to use so-called extended lottery games with
the same payoff structures as the respective trust games in the pre-
sent studies. In the extended lottery game paradigm, Person A can
either keep their initial endowment, in which case another Person
(Person B) also gets the same amount of money, or Person A can stake
their money in a lottery. If Person A wins that gamble, both players
earn an amount of money that is higher than the initial endowment. If
Person A loses that gamble, Person A gets nothing (or very little
money), whereas Person B gets much more. Thus, the extended lot-
tery game resembles the trust game, as in both paradigms Persons A
interact with a Person B. In both paradigms, by choosing the risky
option, Persons A can “enlarge the pie.” But only in the trust game is
Person A dependent on the trustworthiness of Person B. Thus, follow-
ing the reasoning of Aimone and Houser, participants should be more
risk-taking in the extended lottery game than in the trust game
because in the extended lottery game they run no risk of being
betrayed. Following the reasoning of Fetchenhauer and Dunning, par-
ticipants should be more risk-taking in the trust game than in the
extended lottery game because only in the trust game do they have to
avoid to question the morality (i.e, trustworthiness) of Person B.
Eighth, both approaches differed in the way they elicited and
measured risk estimates in the situations that were used as a contrast
to the trust game. In the present studies, we largely followed the para-
digm of Aimone and Houser in that chances to win when choosing
the risky option were dependent on the percentage of trustworthy
Persons B across all conditions.
2 | STUDY 1
The main aim of Study 1 was to investigate whether participants
would be more or less risk-taking in a trust game as compared with an
extended lottery game. Further, we wanted to test whether the con-
tradicting results of past studies were due to the different payoff
structures of Fetchenhauer and Dunning on the one hand and Aimone
and Houser on the other hand. Thus, in the symmetrical payoff
condition, each participant in the role of Person A got €5 (about $6)
that they could keep for themselves or hand over to Person B. If Per-
son A sent the money to Person B, the initial €5 was quadrupled to an
amount of €20. In the case Person B divided the money equally, Per-
son A earned a total of €10, in the case Person B kept all the money
for themselves, Person A went home without anything. Note that
such symmetrical payoff structures are widely used in trust game
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studies. In the asymmetrical payoff condition, we followed the lead of
Aimone and Houser. As in the other condition, participants got €5 that
they could keep for themselves or hand over to Person B. If Person A
sent the money to Person B, the initial €5 was multiplied by a factor
of 6 to a total of €30. In the case Person B divided the money equally,
Person A earned a total of €15; in the other case, Person B kept €28
for themselves, giving €2 to Person A. Thus, in the symmetrical payoff
condition, the scheme was double or nothing, whereas in the asym-
metrical payoff condition, Person A could potentially earn three-times
their initial endowment and in the worst case would only lose 60% of
it (€3 out of €5).
Hence, we employed a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, the first
factor being the payoff structure of the games (symmetrical versus
asymmetrical payoff structure) and the second factor being the kind
of game (trust game versus extended lottery game). Given previous
research, we expected that participants' behavior would also be
influenced by the likelihood of approaching a trustworthy Person B in
the trust game and by the likelihood of winning the lottery in the
extended lottery game, respectively. Therefore, we employed the fol-
lowing yoking procedure: We asked every participant in the trust
game condition to estimate the percentage of trustworthy Persons
B. The next participants in the extended lottery condition were given
the estimate of the previous participants as their fixed probability of
winning the lottery. By this, we made sure that the average, but also
the distribution, of the probabilities of winning and losing when taking
the risky option were identical in both paradigms.
2.1 | Methods
2.1.1 | Participants
Three hundred eight Persons A were recruited on the campus of the
University of Cologne, Germany. They were between 17 and 38 years
old (M = 22.70, SD = 3.35), studying a large variety of programs. The
sample contained 154 (50.0%) female and 153 (49.7%) male subjects.
One participant chose to be identified as neither male nor female.
The corresponding 308 Persons B were recruited in large lectures
of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences of the
University of Cologne, and they predominantly studied business
administration or social sciences. They were between 18 and 74 years
old (M = 23.03, SD = 9.02); 167 (54.2%) of them were female, and




Participants in the role of Person A were seated in front of one of
eight computers (separated by opaque dividers) as they entered the
laboratory. After seeing a welcome screen with general information
on the study, they generated a code word that enabled them to
receive their payoff anonymously after they completed the study.
Depending on the condition they had been randomly assigned to
beforehand, they then read a description of either the trust game or
the extended lottery game, either with asymmetrical payoffs or with
symmetrical payoffs. Several questions were asked in order to test if
Persons A understood the situation.
After that, participants in the trust game condition were asked to
estimate the percentage of Persons B who would give half of their
money to Person A and the corresponding percentage who would
keep everything for themselves.
For the extended lottery game condition, we used the aforemen-
tioned “yoking” procedure: Every probability estimated by a partici-
pant in the trust game was subsequently used as a fixed
communicated probability in the extended lottery game. For example,
if a trust game participant in the symmetrical payoff condition esti-
mated that 30% of Persons B would choose option to give €10 back,
then later on an extended lottery game participant in the symmetrical
payoff condition was informed that in this game, if the risky option
was chosen, the chance of receiving €10 was 30%.
The next screen informed participants that they had been allo-
cated the role of Person A. They were informed that Person B was a
randomly allocated person who studied at the University of Cologne
(Germany), that Person B was not in the same room, that they would
not get to know each other, and—in the trust game—that Person B
had already taken a decision in case Person A would choose the risky
option (earlier studies have shown that the order in which Person A
and Person B are making their decision is irrelevant; see Schlösser
et al., 2015). It was emphasized that the decision Persons A were
about to take was about real money that they would receive anony-
mously immediately after the study in an envelope by an assistant in
another room. Participants' understanding of their role was tested by
three control questions.
After they had completed the study, participants' payoffs were
determined. For trust game participants, this meant that they were
randomly matched with a Person B decision; for extended lottery
game participants, this meant that a random mechanism determined
their payoffs based on the probability that had been communicated to
them. Then, participants had to go to another room, state their code
word, and obtained their payoffs.
Persons B
Participants in the role of Person B received print questionnaires that
were structurally equivalent to the on-screen study Persons A com-
pleted. In the trust game condition, they made an actual decision for
real money. In the extended lottery game, they were merely informed
about their part in the game.
2.2 | Results
Of all Persons B in the trust game 72.1% turned out to be trustworthy
(i.e., they decided to split the money evenly between themselves and
Person A). As in earlier studies, Persons A were rather skeptical about
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Persons B's trustworthiness. The average estimate was close to an
estimate of 50% trustworthy Persons B, but the dispersion of these
estimates was broad (n = 154, M = 48.70, SD = 24.08). The lowest
estimate was 2% and the highest 95%.
Thus, participants significantly underestimated Persons B's trust-
worthiness (one sample t-test: t = −17.150, p < .001).
Nonetheless, across all conditions, 78.9% of all participants chose
to take the risky option, whereas 21.1% decided to keep their initial
endowment.
First, we tested whether these decisions were influenced by the
payoff conditions. Indeed, whereas 87.0% of all participants took the
risky option in the asymmetrical payoff condition, only 70.8% did so
in the symmetrical payoff condition (χ2 = 12.19, p < .001).
Next, we analyzed the influence of the kind of game on partici-
pants' decisions. Participants were more willing to take the risky
option in the trust game (83.1%) than in the extended lottery game
(74.7%). However, this difference was only marginally significant (χ2 =
3.30, p = .069, two-tailed).
Figure 1 shows the percentage of risky decisions across all four
experimental conditions.
As expected, across conditions, participants were the more willing
to take the risky option the higher the (perceived) probability that
such a decision would lead to a positive outcome (r = .287; p < .001).
To analyze the influence of all three independent variables simulta-
neously, we ran a binary-logistic regression analysis using the partici-
pants' decision as dependent variable and kind of game, payoff
structure, and expectations as independent variables. The results are
shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the multivariate analysis confirmed
the results that were found on a bivariate level. Both expectations (eβ =
1.04, p < .001, 95% CI [1.02, 1.05]) and payoff structure (eβ = 3.22, p <
.001, 95% CI [1.73, 6.00]; asymmetrical vs. symmetrical) had a highly
significant influence on participants' decisions, whereas the influence of
the type of game was only marginally significant (eβ = 1.81, p = .053,
two-tailed, 95% CI [0.99, 3.30]; trust game vs. extended lottery game).
We further tested potential interactions between all three independent
variables but did not find any significant result.
2.3 | Discussion
Study 1 aimed to simultaneously test three different predictions on
how participants deal with risks of betrayal in trust games as
compared with risks that do not imply a potential betrayal. To summa-
rize, we did find consistent evidence for some kind of rational
decision-making in that participants were more risk-taking in the
asymmetrical payoff condition (in which lots was to gain and little was
to lose) than in the symmetrical payoff condition and they were the
more willing to take that risk the higher the (perceived) probability of
a positive outcome.
We did not find any evidence for betrayal aversion. If the fear of
being exploited makes people shy away from making themselves vul-
nerable in a trust game, rates of risk-taking in the extended lottery
game should have been higher than in the trust game, as fear of
betrayal should not play a role in the extended lottery game. Yet, this
is not what we found. To the contrary, we did find evidence for princi-
pled trustfulness as participants were more willing to hand over their
money in the trust game than in the extended lottery game, although
this effect was only marginally significant.
We used a yoking procedure to make sure that the average as
well as the distribution of all probabilities to increase one's money
when taking the risky option were identical in the trust game and the
extended lottery game. However, they still differed in one important
detail. For participants in the trust game, their decisions were based
on a probability that they had to estimate themselves and of which
they knew that this probability could be fundamentally wrong. Partici-
pants in the extended lottery game were simply told the exact proba-
bility of drawing a win in that lottery. Thus, decisions in the trust
game were decisions under uncertainty, whereas decisions in the
extended lottery game were decisions under risk. However, it has
often been shown that most participants are averse to ambiguities
(i.e., they prefer known over unknown risks; Ellsberg, 1961). Recently,
Evans and Krueger (2017) showed that participants reacted more to
objectively given information about an interaction partner's
F IGURE 1 Risk-taking rates across conditions
TABLE 1 Binary-logistic regression testing the effects of type of
game, payoff structure, and expectations/probabilities on risk-taking
Variable B SE p eβ
Constant -0.996 0.385 .010 0.369
Type of Game 0.594 0.306 .053 1.811
Payoff Structure 1.170 0.317 .000 3.220
Expectations/Probabilities 0.035 0.007 .000 1.036
Nagelkerke R2 .212
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trustworthiness than they acted on their own estimates of their inter-
action partner's trustworthiness. Thus, ambiguity aversion might have
decreased the effects of principled trustfulness.
What is striking is the high degree of risk-taking across all four
different conditions. Whereas Aimone and Houser would have
expected risk aversion in the trust game, Fetchenhauer and Dunning
would have expected risk aversion in the expected lottery game.
Yet, both predictions proved wrong. In each of the four conditions,
of those estimating the chance of winning being between 40% and
60%, a vast majority of more than 80% participants went for the
risky option. Especially in the symmetrical payoff conditions, this
indicates a remarkably high degree of risk-seeking. It is not easy to
explain this result.
3 | STUDY 2
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend the results of Study 1. Again,
we let participants play trust games and extended lottery games under
different payoff conditions, but we slightly changed the setup in the
following way.
First, we used a within-subjects design and let all participants play
both games consecutively (in random order). Before they made their
decisions in either game, we explained to them the paradigm of the
trust game and let them estimate the number of trustworthy Persons
B. Participants were told that in the trust game they would be ran-
domly paired with a single Person B and that the likelihood of winning
in the extended lottery game was equal to the percentage of trust-
worthy Persons B in the trust game. Thus, in both paradigms, partici-
pants made a decision under uncertainty with identical probabilities to
win or lose—whereas in the between-subjects setup in Study 1, the
trust game was a decision under uncertainty, but the extended lottery
game was a decision under risk.
Second, the study reported here took place after participants had
taken part in another study that lasted about 1 hour and for which par-
ticipants were paid €10. They were told that when making their deci-
sion, they could either keep these €10 or they could use this money to
send it to Person B in the trust game or to take the risky option in the
extended lottery game, respectively. As students had worked 1 hour to
earn their endowment for the experiment, we expected participants to
be less in a “gambling mode” than some of them might have been in
Study 1. Note that this should work in favor of betrayal aversion, as it
can be assumed that losing one's own income to an untrustworthy Per-
son B feels even worse than losing money that one has gotten from the
experimenter without having had to work for it.
3.1 | Methods
3.1.1 | Participants
Two hundred thirty-three participants took part in the study. As in
Study 1, they were recruited on the campus of the University of
Cologne, and again, a mix of disciplines was ensured. One hundred
twenty-two subjects (54.7%) were female, and 99 (44.4%) were
male. Two subjects (0.9 %) chose to classify themselves as neither
female nor male (we did not find any gender differences in the pre-
sent study). Participants' age ranged from 17 to 45 years (M =
21.45, SD = 3.22).
3.1.2 | Procedure
After participants had completed an hour-long unrelated study, they
received a new paper-and-pencil questionnaire. It informed them that
they would have to make three decisions, one of which would be rele-
vant to their payoff.
In the first half of the questionnaire, the trust game and the
extended lottery game were explained to participants in fixed order.
As compared to Study 1, absolute payoffs stated in the first two
games were twice as high due to the higher initial endowment (which
was €10 instead of €5). The factor by which the initial endowment
was multiplied when Person A chose the risky option was identical to
Study 1, so relative payoffs had not changed.
The extended lottery was verbally illustrated by an urn containing
red and white balls: For example, in the symmetrical payoff condition,
participants were told that if they chose to take part in the lottery and
they drew a white ball, they would receive nothing and Person B
would receive €40 (which equaled the outcome of being paired with
an untrustworthy Person B in the trust game), whereas if they drew a
red ball, they and Person B would each receive €20 (which equaled
the outcome of being paired with a trustworthy Person B in the trust
game). They were also told that the probabilities of drawing a red or a
white ball equaled the probabilities of the respective outcome options
in the trust game, that is, they were derived from Persons B's behavior
in the trust game.
After each explanation of a decision situation, questions tested
for participants' understanding. After the trust game, participants
were furthermore asked for their expectations regarding the behavior
of Persons B.
In the second half of the questionnaire, participants had to indi-
cate their concrete decisions in random order for the trust game and
the extended lottery game. To make their decisions, they were
allowed to reread the situations, and they were reminded that one of
their decisions would be for real money, that is, involving the €10 they
received for the unrelated prior study. After the decisions, demo-
graphic data were collected, and participants were thanked.
After their decisions in the trust game and the extended lottery
game, participants had also been asked to decide whether they would
be willing to participate in a simple coin-flip (and had been told that
one of these decisions would be for actual money). At the end of the
study, the experimenter informed the participants that the decision
made for real money would be that decision. If they had indicated to
take part, the experimenter flipped a coin in front of them, determin-
ing their payoff; if they did not, the experimenter would hand them
their €10.
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3.2 | Results
Across both kinds of game and both payoff structures, 34.6% of all
participants decided to take the risky option.
For analyzing the data properly, we applied a mixed multilevel
regression model, taking care of the nested data structure as the deci-
sions in the trust game and decisions in the extended lottery were
elicited within one subject as repeated binary measurements. To take
care of participants' idiosyncrasies consequently, a model was applied
that considers random intercepts and random slopes across individ-
uals regarding their repeated decisions, as this should account for
potential correlations of the decisions elicited in the within-subject
design. The results showed that the order in which the two decisions
were taken had no effect on participants' behavior (eβ = 0.78, p = .35,
95% CI [0.47, 1.31]; trust game first vs. extended lottery game first).
Importantly, these decisions were also independent from the different
payoff structure (eβ = 1.42, p = .18, 95% CI [0.85, 2.34]; asymmetrical
vs. symmetrical). Furthermore, no interaction effect of these two fac-
tors was detected (eβ = 0.69, p = .49, 95% CI [0.25, 1.96]).
However, it turned out that more participants chose the risky
option in the trust game than in the extended lottery game (40.8%
vs. 28.2%; eβ = 1.87, p < .01, 95% CI [1.23, 2.85]; trust game
vs. extended lottery game fixed effect under the control of the
respective nonsignificant random slope effect and a significant ran-
dom intercept term). Figure 2 shows the percentage of risky decisions
across the two independent variables. As can be seen, in both payoff
conditions, more participants chose the risky option in the trust game
as compared with the extended lottery game.
Table 2 shows that behavior in both kinds of games was highly
related. A majority of 52.3% kept their money in both paradigms,
21.5% took the risky option in both conditions. Only a small minority
of 6.7% staked their money in the extended lottery game but kept
their money in the trust game. Compared with that, many more
(19.3%) kept their money in the extended lottery game but sent their
money in the trust game. As in Study 1, participants' decisions were
influenced by their estimates about the percentage of trustworthy
Persons B. However, the correlation between these estimates and
behavior in the trust game (r = .42; p < .01) was stronger than the
correlation between these estimates and behavior in the extended lot-
tery game (r = .16; p < .01). A z-test revealed that this difference was
highly significant (z = 3.1; p < .01). A multilevel analysis confirmed
these findings under control of the nested repeated measure structure
of the data (expectations of trustworthiness as a control: eβ = 2.07,
p < .001, 95% CI [1.57, 2.71]; another model, testing for an interaction
of expectations with decisions in trust game vs. extended lottery
game: eβ = 1.94, p = .005, 95% CI [1.22, 3.09]).
To summarize, in Study 2, we found no evidence for betrayal
aversion, but as the willingness to choose the risky option was sub-
stantially higher in the trust game as compared with the extended lot-
tery game, there was clear evidence for principled trustfulness. This
effect was neither moderated by the different payoff structures that
were applied nor by the order in which both games were played or
the perceived likelihood to be paired with a trustworthy Person
B. Estimates of the percentage of trustworthy Persons B influenced
participants' decisions in both games but did so significantly more
strongly in the trust game (although it had the same logical relevance
for both decisions).
4 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present studies was to further investigate how deci-
sions in trust situations differ from other situations in which taking a
risky option does not imply making oneself vulnerable to the trust-
worthiness of another person. Thus, in both studies, we contrasted
participants' behavior in a trust game with the behavior in an
F IGURE 2 Risk-taking rates across game type
and payoff structures
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extended lottery game. In both games, another Person B was
involved; in both games, Person A could enlarge the pie by choosing
the risky option; in both games, payoff structures and probabilities to
win or lose were identical, but only in the trust game did Person A run
the risk of having their trust betrayed by Person B.
We contrasted the payoff structures used by Aimone and Houser
(2011), on the one side, and Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009), on
the other side, because both labs had asked participants for their con-
crete decisions in trust games in the past (unlike, e.g., Bohnet &
Zeckhauser, 2004, who had asked for “minimum acceptable probabili-
ties”) but had obtained results pointing to opposing directions.
Regarding the two games, theoretically, there were three potential
outcomes of these studies: (a) Rates of risk-taking could have been
equal in both games (indicating that trust decisions are not different
from other risky decisions), (b) rates of risk-taking could have been
lower in the trust game than in the extended lottery game (indicating
betrayal aversion in Persons A), and (c) rates of risk-taking could have
been higher in the trust game than in the extended lottery game (indi-
cating principled trustfulness in Persons A).
The results we obtained across both studies partly differed and
were partly identical. To start with the differences, first, it has to be
noted that the willingness to choose the risky alternative significantly
differed across both studies. Indeed, across all conditions, risk-taking
rates in Study 1 were more than twice as high as in Study 2 (78.9%
vs. 34.6%). Compared with other studies both by ourselves
(e.g., Dunning et al., 2014; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009) and by
others (e.g., Aimone et al., 2014; Evans & Krueger, 2011), risk-taking
in Study 2 was inconspicuous but was surprisingly high in Study
1. Although it is difficult to prove any potential explanation for this
result, we would argue that it was likely due to the different general
setup of both studies. In Study 1, participants were invited to our lab
and only played the trust game or the extended lottery game. They
knew that they participated in a psychological study on “decision-
making,” which might have triggered motives to learn something
about human behavior (i.e., about oneself and other people). Yet,
insight into others' behavior was only possible if one chose the risky
option. Therefore, it might have felt like an anticlimax to simply keep
one's initial endowment and to never find out what would have hap-
pened had one decided for the risky, much more thrilling alternative.
In contrast to this, in Study 2, participants earned €10 by filling in
questionnaires for about 1 hour, and we explicitly told them that it
was this money they were given as endowment for the decisions they
had to make in our study. Therefore, they might have been more hesi-
tant to risk losing their money. In line with this reasoning, when asked
whether they wanted to use their endowment to flip a coin (the deci-
sion that finally was made for real money), a vast majority of 86.4%
decided to decline and to keep their money. Thus, we would argue
that the external validity of Study 2 may be regarded as higher than
the external validity of Study 1, since in real life, most people in most
situations will not make their trust decisions just for the thrill of the
situation.
This might also explain another difference between both stud-
ies, namely, that the different payoff structures influenced
participants' behavior in Study 1 but not in Study 2. It makes
sense that one takes into consideration what is to lose and what
is to win when being in a rather playful or gambling mode. Yet, in
the more serious circumstances of Study 2, participants might have
taken their decision based on internal principles rather than on
external incentives. However, it has to be acknowledged that this
explanation is rather post hoc as we did expect to find an influ-
ence of the payoff structure in both studies.
Expectations played a role in both studies. The higher the per-
ceived likelihood of winning, the more were participants willing to
hand over their money to Person B. Although this might sound trivial,
this finding indicates that decisions in our studies did have a rational
and calculative element. Interestingly, in Study 2, expectations played
a much bigger role in the trust game than in the extended lottery
game (for similar results see Evans & Krueger, 2017). Maybe in the
extended lottery game, the likelihood of winning was (nearly) ignored
in a similar way as was the payoff structure, and participants rather
took a principled decision whether to gamble with the salary that they
had gotten for 1 hour of filling in questionnaires. Furthermore, it
might be the case that participants—knowing that they had to make
an actual decision—adapted their estimates to make their decision
appear more rational (“I am about to send my money to Person B;
thus, I believe that person will be trustworthy”).
The main question of both studies was whether participants'
behavior would indicate the presence of betrayal aversion or whether
participants' behavior would rather indicate the presence of principled
trustfulness. It should be noted that in psychology, there are not many
occasions at which two different lines of reasoning come up with two
very specific and contradictory hypotheses.
In both studies, participants were more willing to choose the
risky option in the trust game than in the extended lottery game.
That is, we found consistent evidence for principled trustfulness,
but we did not find any evidence for betrayal aversion on a behav-
ioral level. A pooled analysis across both studies revealed that the
inverse variance weighted effect size of the game type (trust game
vs. extended lottery game) gained an odds ratio of 1.85 (p = .013).
Furthermore, we did not find any evidence for this effect being
moderated by the payoff structure or the order in which decisions
were made. As mentioned before, we obtained very different rates
of risk-taking in both studies, but we found principled trustfulness
in both of them.
Our initial expectation was that the different results of Aimone
and Houser and Fetchenhauer and Dunning in the past would be due
to the different payoff structures. Thus, we expected to find princi-
pled trustfulness in the symmetrical payoff structure and to find
betrayal aversion in the asymmetrical payoff structure. Yet, in both
studies, there was no sign of such interaction effects.
How come that we were not able to replicate any of the results
that speak for the existence of people reacting in line with the con-
cept of betrayal aversion? First, as mentioned, the previous results of
Aimone and Houser were based on rather small sample sizes: In
Aimone and Houser (2011) and (2012), they had 26 participants in the
know condition and 25 participants in the don't know condition. Also
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keep in mind that in a pretest, only 7 out of 31 participants were able
to answer all control questions on the quite complex instructions used
by Aimone and Houser correctly (Götmann, 2014).
Second, even within their own paradigm, studies only partly con-
firm the dominance of betrayal aversion as determining participants'
decisions in trust games. For example, Aimone et al. (2015) conceptu-
alized betrayal aversion as a personality measure and found that only
44.6% of all participants could be classified as betrayal averse. A simi-
lar result was obtained in the functional MRI study by Aimone et al.
(2014), in which participants made a total of 82 decisions (41 decisions
in the know condition and 41 decisions in the don't know condition).
Based on these decisions, less than a third (8 out of 30) participants
could be classified as betrayal averse (i.e., they were significantly more
risk-taking in the don't know condition than in the know condition).
It should be noted that the extended lottery game should have
given the concept of betrayal aversion a very fair chance to show up
in our data. In this paradigm, when taking the risky option and losing
their money, participants do not have to be angry about having been
betrayed by Person B, and additionally, they could feel a warm glow
(Andreoni, 1989) that at least another person has earned some
money.
In contrast, the present studies are very much in line with the
results we obtained before. As mentioned above, in a number of stud-
ies, we could show that participants are more willing to hand over
their money to an anonymous Person B in a trust game than they are
willing to gamble on a lottery with identical payoffs and identical
probabilities of losing and winning (e.g., Dunning et al., 2014;
Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2012). Furthermore, we found evi-
dence that in trust games people feel obliged to hand over their
money to Person B (Dunning et al., 2014) and that they experience
emotions of tenseness and uneasiness when thinking about keeping
their money (Schlösser et al., 2016).
Taken together, we feel confident that in trust decisions princi-
pled trustfulness plays a more substantial role than betrayal aversion,
at least in one-shot interactions. It would be worthwhile to investigate
whether betrayal aversion would be able to predict participants'
behavior in repeated trust games when participants might have made
negative or ambivalent experiences with a specific interaction partner.
Furthermore, we think that betrayal aversion does indeed exist
on an affective level. It can hardly be denied that it hurts when your
trust is abused. Thus, people might shy away from situations in which
they make themselves vulnerable to the trustworthiness of another
person. But to openly signal one's distrust to another person seems to
feel even worse.
This might be functional both on an individual and on a socie-
tal level. Only when we make us vulnerable by trusting each other
in the first place can we prove our trustworthiness
(Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010). This is necessary for trust to ful-
fill its vital role in intimate relationships, friendships, organizations,
and societies as a whole. Maybe much of the trust we observe in
these institutions is not so much based on the optimistic expecta-
tion for trust to be rewarded but rather on the bad feelings associ-
ated with signaling one's distrust.
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